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States is concerned, with friendly neighbors to the north and south
of us and great oceans on the other sides, bombardment airplanes are
weapons of pure defense and not of aggression. They cannot wage
offensive war against any enemy within his own territory, but they
are a powerful deterrent to any enemy who would cross the oceans
to attack us.
The use of the Air Force in coast defense will, of course, be a
combination of independent missions of bombardment and as the
enemy comes within the sphere of influence of ground arms of
close-support missions. In this connection, I cannot conceive of any
enemy attempting a landing on our coasts without first gaining air
superiority. A landing on a hostile shore has always been a hazardous
undertaking, and with the advent of air power its difficulties are
tremendously increased.
In the Italo-Ethiopian War, if Ethiopia had had an effective air
force, the outcome might have been very different. The Italians used
two seaports for their operations against Ethiopia Massawa and
Mogadishu. The principal port was Massawa, on the Red Sea. Prior
to the war, the capacity of this little port is said to have been but
300 metric tons per day. Before the Italian operations reached their
peak, the daily capacity of this port had been expanded to 4500 metric
tons. About 2000 metric tons per day were hauled by truck from base
to front over a tortuous I-way mountain road (up for twelve hours
and down for twelve hours). The remaining tonnage was stored in vast
dumps at the port. Such a target would have been ideal for Ethiopian
bombardment aviation had there been any, and would have required
a tremendous amount of Italian effort for its protection.
The port used as base for the Southeastern Italian forces was Moga
dishu, on the Indian Ocean. This port, I understand, is nothing more
than an open roadstead, not usable during certain seasons of the year.
All cargoes were unloaded from ships to lighters and thence to shore.
A force of bombers from airdromes located centrally in the vicinity
of Addis Ababa probably could have denied to the Italians the use
of both of these ports.
There was little opportunity for the employment of Italian bombard
ment aviation in its true role of providing indirect support to the
ground forces by the disruption of supply and transport systems in
the rear areas, for such systems did not exist in semibarbarous Ethio
pia. However, Italian aviation rendered incalculable assistance to the
ground forces by guarding against surprise, by breaking up concen
trations and attacks, by exploiting pursuits, and by transport of troops
and supplies.
It is pertinent here to add a few additional remarks, largely from
the tactical point of view, with reference to the necessity for large
airplanes for reconnaissance and bombardment. Large airplanes can
reënforce Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama by air from United States.
From there or from the United States one of their most important
missions would be to the enemy the use of any base he may attempt
to seize. They should also be able to afford invaluable support to our
fleet in its operations against an enemy fleet. These are the primary
contributions of air power to defense, and are essential forms of action
which no other military forces can undertake.
In conclusion, I have attempted in this short article to give readers
of Army Ordnance the high lights of the problems and powers
of the GHQ Air Force as the instrument of defensive air power in
continental United States. The organization of the GHQ Air Force
has made tremendous strides, and it has greatly increased its profi-
