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The China incident has begun to strain the relations between Japan
and Britain. Some of our people are already of opinion that an Anglo-
Japanese war is inevitable. Things, however, have not gone so far as to
make us think that the ultimate development of the China incident must
lead to such a war. Nevertheless, it is true that the conflicting issues newly
raised between Japan and Britain are now pressing themselves upon the
minds of our people more forcibly than our issues with the Soviet which
have, at least, lost their novelty. Our issue with Britain, needless to say,
arose when, her huge vested interests in China being jeopardized by the
hostilities, she began to render unveiled diplomatic and military assistance
against Japan in order to check the advance of her troops or to minimize
the extent of damage done. Yet this, after all, was only the immediate
cause, and far more important is the ulterior cause lying behind this. This
ulterior cause is to be seen in the fact that the traditional Far Eastern
policy of Great Britain has seen a break-down in consequence of her
growing disagreement with Japan.
Great Britain's Far Eastern policy is inseparably interwoven with her
fundamental foreign policy, being one important link in the whole chain.
The fundamental British foreign policy is based on three factors, namely,
her naval power, her colonies and her foreign trade. Britain for centuries
maintained a naval power second to noneshe long possessed the largest
colonies in the whole world and, in foreign trade, too, Britain for centuries
held the premier position. Her foremost position in these three directions
she sought to maintain by every means in her power. She entered on a
naval construction race with Germany which led to the World War in
order to hold her vast colonial possessions she did not scruple to carry
through ruthless repressive measures and for the maintenance of her pre
mier position in the world market she made heavy investments abroad, 'built
up a formidable fleet of merchantmen, and concluded commercial agree
ments on the best terms she could exact. Her foreign policy in concert
with, and as its inevitable extension of, her internal policy, was built on
the basis of the world-wide command of sea by arms, of maintenance of
her foremost tradal position and her colonies.
The combination of these three factors, however, began to break up
after the World War. Every one knows that her naval power dropped to
the level of the American navy at the Washington conference of 1922, when
the 5-5-3 ratio adopted on that occasion showed the three-fold combination
had broken down. Furthermore, in 1929 the foremost position she had
for centuries held in the world markets was surrendered to the United
States of America. Accordingly it is only in her colonial possessions that
she now holds the premier position. Nor is her position in this regards
too secure. Colonel House has set the ball rolling with his plan for the
redistribution of colonies, and the growing conflict between the „haves"
and the „have-nots" augurs no good for her.
An American named Denny has written a book entitled „America Will
Conquer Britain", which appears true in the light of fact. Thus Britain s
diplomatic policy has been deprived of its very foundation and she has
been compelled to make a turn about in her foreign policy. The inevitable
outcome of this change was seen in her policy of setting all countries in
conflict with the United States, so as to regain her former premier position
in the three essential points while these other countries were in conflict
among themselves.
What form did this changed diplomatic policy of Britain assume with
regard to the Far East? Needless to say, the British policy was to set Japan
against the United States of America, to pit the one against the other
politically, economically and in the military field and it must be admitted
that up to a point this policy has proved successful. The formidable American
navy has for some years been kept in the Pacific, and what is more, the
American fleet is constantly making trans-oceanic manoeuvres. Nobody
