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could imagine that these naval exercises were directed against the British
navy, and indeed, Britain benefits largely from the situation. By keeping
the American and the Japanese navies face to face, Britain holds the two
largest potential enemy naval powers removed not only from the Atlantic,
where her interests are heaviest, but also from the Indian and southern
seas and meanwhile, she may replenish her naval strength.
At the time of the Manchurian incident Britain withheld her support of
the Stimson diplomacy to make it a failure. Later, an industrial delegation
under Lord Barnby was despatched to Manchukuo, thereby giving an
impression as if her recognition of the new Empire was forthcoming. All
these things were done in accordance with the British policy to direct
Japan's attention to the United States.
This diplomatic policy, however, could go only a certain length, and
no farther. It is true that the navy of the rising Japan is set against the
the American navy and that the existence of Manchukuo is a barrier against
the eastern penetration of the Soviet Union. While things remained so,
it was well, and British foreign policy had proved successful. But radical
changes have taken place. The establishment of Manchukuo gave rise to
unrest in North China. Japan's influence continually extended through
China and Britain began to feel her interests there were exposed to increa
sing menaces. So she resorted to her old game Japan and China were set
against each other.
The only way of directing China against Japan was to give a sufficiently
strong support to the Chiang Kai-Shek regime. Leith Ross's assistance
in effecting the currency reform, General Hammond's railway construction
plan and other forms of assistance, almost without number, have been
made in support of China. At the same time, Britain prepared a background
for China's anti-Japanese activity. Of the Soviet's assistance of China's
anti-Japanese movement little need be said.
However, Britain had not extended her support in order to promote
a war between Japan and China. Now that the war has broken out, Britain
does not wish to see Japan conquer China beyond recovery. Had Japan
and China been kept in a constant state of dispute over small matters,
the end of British diplomacy would have been served well enough.
But things have moved quite contrary to the British expectations, and
grave hostilities have broken out in China. They have been in progress
not only in North China but also in South China of which Shanghai is the
centre. Moreover, Japan has declared that she would fight until China
should be thoroughly punished. Thus the British interests in China have
come to be menaced, and British diplomatic policy aimed at keeping Japan
in a state of dispute with China has seen a break-down. In these circum
stances, Britain had only one line of policy to follow. She has, like the
Soviet Union, given support to China overtly and covertly, in order to
enable her to carry on a protracted war to dive Japan to exhaustion. She
has not neglected to bring in America, who, however, has so far shown no
disposition to be drawn into the melee. Britain has now no choice but to
come into the open against Japan, the incontestable failure of the Brussels
conference has forced Britain her to do that.
British diplomacy, although successful in setting France and Russia
against Germany before the World War and later in confronting Japan
against America, proved a failure when it pitted Japan against China.
This situation has increased the possibility of Britain herself 'being dragged
into the fray. The strained relations between Japan and Britain are a
result of the collapse in the Far East of the traditional foreign policy of
Great Britain.
As stated already, although the issues between the two countries are
assuming an increasingly ugly aspect, things have not yet gone so far as
to warrant the conclusion that a war is unavoidable. However, this is not
