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to say that they will never fight. It would be more appropriate to say that
an Anglo-Japanese war is a contingency but not a certainty.
Should there be a war between Japan and Britain it would be absolutely
at the latter's provocation, however the external evidence might point to
the contrary. But Britain is not prepared enough to provoke such a war.
International affairs, too, scarcely favour such a venture at this moment.
The British fleet in the Far East consists of some 35 men-of-war. It is
unimaginable that this naval strength could cope with the powerful Japa
nese fleet. The British Far Eastern fleet is not formed in relation to the
present situation but to the situation as it would have continued to exist
but for the present outbreak. It is true that the grandiose scheme of con
struction at Singapore is all but completed) and this naval port will unques
tionably give Britain a much stronger position. Its importance may be seen
in the following points (1) as a gateway to the Far Eastern waters (2) it
provides an excellent anchorage not only in the old channel but also in
Keppel Bay (3) Borneo's oil and India's coal fields are within a distance
of only 400 miles and (4) it is an important position also in aerial strategy,
since the flight between London and Singapore consumes only 120 hours,
with many colonies as stopping places between the two. Hongkong, as a
matter of common knowledge, is being rapidly strengthened in its fortifi
cations. In the preincident days there was a rumour of fortifying the island
of Hainan. Despite all these naval bases and their strengthened fortifica
tions, however, the British Far Eastern fleet as it is would not he such a
formidable proposition.
It is true that in the event of war Britain would divert a part of her
home fleet to the Far Eastern waters. But it is hardly believable that such
a detachment would be of sufficient strength to fight a successful battle
with the Japanese fleet. The Spanish civil war still going om, the situation
in the Mediterranean is far from reassuring. The British route to the Far
East is exposed to serious danger. Hector Bywater said that Italy could
concentrate her naval and air forces in the middle section of the Mediter
ranean and easily cut the British line of communication with the Far East.
This route is a veritable life-line to Britain. The way round the Cape of
Good Hope would be the last route to choose. At all costs Britain would
have to guard her route through the Mediterranean. This calls for the
presence of strong enough naval forces in that direction. This requirement
would necessarily have important effects on the quality of ships to be
despatched to the Far East.
What is more, the rising naval strength of Germany should also be
reckoned with. Bywater speaks of it to the following effectThere is a bad
shoal in the British channel. Whenever Britain adds 100 tons to her fleet,
Germany, on the other side of the water, adds 35 tons to her fleet under
the terms of the treaty concluded in 1935. What is more, 'Germany is taking
full advantage of this privilege. If this goes on for a few years, the British
people will be certain to see on the North Sea a German fleet equipped
with the utmost strength that the best of modem science can develop.
Since Britain obviously could not turn more than half her naval strength
in this direction the North Sea may again become the sea of Germany.
When that time comes, Germany will be certain to demand from Britain
the return of the former German colonies.
In consequence of the military development of Germany and Italy, Britain
would not be in a position, if she wished, to despatch any strong fleet to
the East from her home waters. To make things even more difficult for
her, Germany and Italy are now Japan's allies. Britain s situation is more
difficult than ever before.
Britain has embarked upon her grandiose armament extension plan at
an estimated cost of 1.500 million over a period of five years. This under-
taking, it is said, calls for a three-fold increase of the Far Eastern fleet.
