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Unguarded north.
It is arguable that the centre of gravity of the Australian defence system
is too far south, that the principle of concentrating the limited means of
defence on the protection of the vital area in the south-east has been
carried too far, that too little provision has been made for retaliating
against an attacker whose first step is the occupation of an advanced
base north of Sydney, perhaps north of Brisbane. The only defended ports
north of Sydney are Brisbane and Darwin. There are no Air Force stations
north of Richmond (though some are planned), yet it is on the coast north
of Newcastle that an enemy might reasonably expect to make a landing
without opposition except by the Air Force. The provision of a well-equipped
base and of Air Force stations further north, from which naval and aerial
threat could be offered to the lines of communication of an invader, seems
to be a necessity.
If such a base would be too isolated, what of Darwin Adequate military
defence of the Queensland coast in the sense of making a landing impossible
is not in Australia's power. But provision of bases in the north is in
keeping with the principle that the best way in which a weak Power can
embarrass an attacker is to threaten his communications.
The immediate needs of Australian defence include provision of the
most modern arms and equipment for the seven divisions of the militia
(it is unlikely that Australia could maintain many more than seven divisions
for a long period) an air force that has a margin of superiority over
the strongest force that any possible attacker can carry in aircraft carriers;
local manufacture of aircraft and enginesstrong coast defences at the
capital cities and along the whole of the vital coastal area between New
castle and Port Kemblaan efficient nucleus of permanent and militia
officers and non-commissioned officers (and a larger cadre of permanent
troops than at present) the storing of vital imported materials and the
organisation of private industry so that Australia could survive a blockade.
Garrison for Darwin.
As Australia has accepted the responsibility of maintaining Darwin as
an adjunct to the Singapore base, there should be an infantry force to
defend it from flank attack, and this must be a permanent force, because
the Darwin population is too small to provide enough militiamen.
In two or three years some of these precautions will have been taken.
There would still remain, however, the lack of a citizen army that
could take field, in a state of reasonable efficiency, at short notice. This
could hardly be done without the expenditure at least of an additional
2,500,000. This would bring Australia's annual defence expenditure to
approximately £2 a head however, the people of Britain are preparing
to spend 6 a head annually on defence.
Such measures at such cost would not provide complete immunity against
attack, hut they would make an invasion of Australia an extremely hazardous
adventure. To-day, if the situation in Europe was such that the British
Navy could not detach a strong force to the Pacific, Australia, with only
her 100 first-line planes, 35,000 partly-trained militiamen, and a naval
squadron that might embarrass but could not prevent attack, offers very
little to deter a resolute, ambitious, and powerful aggressor.
