rough bij de raadpensionaris in de pas stond, geeft hij de schuld
aan Cadogan. Verklaarbaar is, dat deze handelwijze, die ook reeds
bij de actie van 18 Juli was gevolgd, kwaad bloed zette.
Op het schadelijke van de verplichting om bij allerlei gelegen
heden krijgsraad te houden had Marlborough reeds meermalen
gewezen. Zeer uitdrukkelijk komt hij op deze kwestie terug in zijn
brief aan Heinsius van de 2e Augustus. 'I am very uneasy in my own
mind to see how everything here is like to go, notwithstanding the
superiority and goodness of our troops, which ought to make us
no doubt of success. However it is certain, that if affairs continue on
the same footing they now are, it will be impossible to attempt
anything considerable with succes or advantage, since councils of war
must be called on every occasion which entirely destroys the secrecy
and dispatch upon which all great undertakings depend: and has
unavoidably another very unhappy effect, for the private animosities
between so many persons as have to be assembled being so great,
and their inclinations and interests so different, as always to make one
party oppose what the other advises, they consequently never agree.
I do not say this because I have the honour of being at the head of
the army, but it is absolutely necessary, that such power be lodged
with the general as may enable him to act as he thinks proper,
according to the best of his judgment, without being obliged ever
to communicate what he intends further than he thinks convenient.
The success of the last campaign, with the blessing of God, was
owing to that power which I wish you would now give for the good
of the public, and that of the States in particular. And if you think
any body can execute it better than myself, I shall be willing to stay in
any of the towns here, having a very good pretext, for I really am sick.
I know this is a very nice point, but it is of the last importance,
for without it no general can act offensively to advantage, or dis
charge with honour the trust that to the world seems to be reposed
in him.
Lieutenant General Hompesch will acquaint you with what I
would undertake if I can be enabled to do it, and if I succeeded, you
will agree, I am sure that it would quickly bring the war to a good
end. On the other hand, if you leave the government of the army as
it now is, to a council of war, the best end you can expect of this
campaign will be the levelling of the lines and the taking of Leau.
But if the French be allowed so much time to strengthen their army
by detachments as they may have, I would be glad you would con
sider, if that might not encourage them to endeavour the hindering
you from doing anything.
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