SUMMARY
Summary of the introduction to 'The Netherlands Airdefence between
10-19 May 1940', by the Historical Section of the Air Staff
The intioduction gives an idea of the essential strategical position of the Nether
lands in Western Europe. It also gives an account of the Dutch combat actions
which caused severe German losses, especially in aircraft which strongly influenced
further German operations during W.W.II. The study is a.o. based on only very
recently obtained official data and records from national, allied and German
sources.
Annexes A and B present
A. Survey of the 'Luftwaffe' units and a/c employed against Holland
especially on May 1 oth, 1940
B. Survey of German aircraft-losses over Holland between 10-19 May,
1940. (The Dutch troops in the province of Zeeland surrendered
on 1 g May).
On 12 March 1937, colonel P.W. Best, future cdr Airdefence Command, stated
in a lecture for 'The Society for Strategical and Tactical Studies':
'An other possibility for a strategic suprise-attack is one where the
attacking force directs the first phase of the combined air-ground
operation against the Netherlands to obtain a jumping-off place
against a more important enemy and by this to prevent our nation
to take an important and active part in further air and ground
operations'.
The events of May 1940 confirmed his vision and it can be said that his views were
even more advanced than those of the German military leaders. Before the out
break of W.W.II, Hitler was only slightly interested in the Netherlands territory;
at that time he wished to respect Netherlands neutrality. A personal study by
General Felmy, C.O. of'Luftflotte 2' on the airwar against Britain which included
airborne opei ations in the northern part of Belgium and western part of Holland
was presented to Hitler and Goering in 1938 but received hardly any notice.
Hitler was only interested in a direct attack against France.
The successes of the Polish campaign in September 1939 changed Hitler's views.
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