SUMMARY
Against the opinion of Supreme Army Command (Oberkommando des Heeres),
Hitler stubbornly stuck to his own opinion which was based on the idea of non
intervention by the Western powers and events proved him to be right. He became
convinced of the inferiority of his western opponents and at the same time
mistrustful of the ability of German Supreme Army Command. This belief
in his visionary military powers was strengthened and at the same time he gradual
ly lost faith in the ability of German Supreme Army Command. These were
reasons for Hitler to change his token-function of Supreme Cdr. Armed Forces
into an active operational personal command. As a result Supreme Army Command
was kept out of the military decision-making process, thereby degrading it into a
kind of technical staff, only for the conversion of already made decisions into
orders. The final downfall of Supreme Army Command resulted from a study by
General H. von Stülpnagel who concluded that the German army because of
the materiel and equipment situation would not be ready for a break-through
of the Maginot line before 1942. He was convinced that Germany could not
enforce a decisive victory in Western Europe and that any attack would result in
a static trenchwarfare. He therefore advised a defensive passive policy. General
field-marshall E. von Manstein points out in his book 'Verlorene Siege' (lost
victories)
He had not considered the possibility of circumventing the Maginot line through
Belgium and Holland, as the German government only very recently had gua
ranteed the neutrality of these nations'.
German Supreme Army Command adopted this defensive passive attitude and
planned accordingly without informing the Fuehrer. This challenge was soon met.
After the Polish campaign and after refusal of his offers for peace by the Western
powers, Hitler - with complete negation of Supreme Army Command - informed
the C-in-C's of the three forces on 27 September 1939, that he had decided to
attack Western Europe as early as the autumn of 1939; consequently violating the
neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. In the first warplan for Western
Europe issued on ig October 1939, 'Aufmarschanweisung Gelb' (advance-order
Yellow there is clear evidence of the doubts of German Army Command in a
decisive victory. It shows a grand conception but left many essential aspects to
improvisation. In many respects it resembles the 1914 'Von Schlieffen-plan'Von
Manstein said: 'Supreme Army Command intended to advance through Holland
and the northern part of Belgium with a strong army group on the right wing
which also was to defeat the British and French forces which could be expected in
Belgium. This formation was to try and gain a decisive victory'
The formations on the southern wing were to be a cover for the operations of the
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