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SUMMARY
ïo January various possibilities for the operational use of para troops (the 7th
'Flieger Division'), were studied. In the morning of 10 January 1940 Hitler
ordered the attack on Western Europe to begin on 17 January at 7.16 hrs.
On 10 January Major Reinberger, liaison-officer of the 7th 'Flieger Division' with
the 2nd Air Army, flew in a Messerschmitt-Bf 108, 'Taifun' from Muenster to
Bonn for a final staffmeeting to decide on planned airborne operations against
Namen and Dinant in Belgium. He had a detailed plan for this operation and
many important secret documents on the whole operation 'Gelb' with him.
Because of a thick smog over the Ruhr area, disorientation by the snowcovered
landscape and a resulting lack of fuel, he had to make an emergency landing on
Belgian territory near Mechelen on the river Meuse. The crew managed to burn
the greater part of the papers but the Belgians captured enough documents to
obtain a more or less complete idea of the German operational plans. The Belgians
soon informed the Netherlands, French and British governments. Because German
High Command was in doubt how much had leaked out, fundamental alterations
in the plans were made. General der Flieger (retd.) W. Speidel stated in his study
'Der Westfeldzug 1939-1940' (the Western Campaign 1939-1940): 'It remains
an open question whether the 'Reinberger' case was a reason for complete
alteration of German plans but it was certain that airborne plans had lost their
operational value and that a complete new concept for airborne operations had to be
worked out'.
°n 25 January 1940, during a meeting at Koblenz, Generaloberst F. von Bock,
cdr B-Army group received from Supreme Army Command an order to capture
the whole of the Netherlands. F01 the operation the complete Airborne Corps - the
'7th Flieger Division' (J^ 4000 para's), the 22nd airborne infantery division,
(i 14 5°° men; 13 500 to be airlifted, the rest to advance with the 18th Army)
was to be used exclusively in a self-contained strategic move against the central-
western defensive heart of Holland with its southern approaches. This meant a
victory for Goering's concept of grand-scale airborne-operations, supported by
the army, to obliterate the Netherlands. Already on the 15th January Goering
ordered the cdr, general major K. Student, to plan a surprise-move against the
heart of Holland in combination with a ground advance.
In this way a grand and bold scheme had grown.
For air-transportation, air-escort and necessary tactical air-interdiction between
900 and 1000 a/c (25% of the 3 824 German first line combat-ready a/c in the
West) were to be assigned. A new change into a central-southern 'Blitzkrieg' on
24 February 1940 still included the airborne-surprise against Holland (the so-
