SUMMARY
German personnel losses were also high: 4 000 men (1 600 p.o.w.'s of which 1 200
p.o.w.'s had been transported to Engeland before 14 May). This amounted to
38% of the total strength of these elite-units. Dutch losses amounted to 3 000 men
including 500 p.o.w.'s.
The Germans succeeded in obtaining control of the bridges in the main corridor
leading into the central part of Holland from the South and in partially binding
the reserve-forces and units of the field army. They had however failed to obtain
a secure bridgehead over the Meuse river near Rotterdam and to capture the
Queen, government etc. Angered by the serious losses of a/c and personnel
(Goering) and the meagre successes (Hitler), the open city of Rotterdam was to
be 'blitzed' as an intimidation.
The Commander of the Netherlands Armed Forces, general H. Winkelman,
capitulated on 14 May 1940 because of the Rotterdam bombardment combined
with simular German threats to bomb other densely populated cities.
Germany, nor any German scholar has ever fully admitted this 'blackmail'.
Dr. jur. E. Spetzler in 'The road to the Battle of Britain seen from a legal view',
hints at the possibility of intimidation, but states that: 'With a view to Dutch
resistance, the hazardous position of the airborne troops and the decisive import
ance of these operations for the overall operations of the German right wing; it
(Germany) could not be expected to abstain from the bombardment etc.
In 5 days of war (10-15 May) Airdefence Command had a score of 328 a/c shot
down or crippled i.e. more than 35% of the 929 German a/c which were used
against the Netherlands (especially on the first day)This also means that Dutch
Air Defence Command in a few (5) days could claim 12% of the total 'Luftwaffe'
losses during a three month operational period over Denmark, Norway, The
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Britain. The Netherlands small 'airforce' with
for the greater part, obsolete a/c, had sustained catastrophic losses. German air
superiority and the preceeding suprise-attacks resulted in a loss of 88 (71,5%) out
of 123 combat-ready a/c. One of the main reasons for the considerable successes of
Dutch Airdefence Command units has been the early and realistic vision of its
commander, lieutenant-general P.W. Best, who realised that his units in a future
conflict would be in a front-line position from the earliest moment. During the
build-up of the A.A. Artillery and the airdefence system, he strictly adhered to
this principle. He regularly gave as his view that:'Our airfields are the key to the
central defence-fortress Holland'. In this he stood quite alone and his views met
little understanding at General Headquarters, which was shown by the small
number of troops assigned for airfield defence.
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