14
begins. l fly the route at 1500 feet and 180 knots,
under visual conditions (the Spitfire is not cleared
for operations in cloud). Oostende and Terneuzen
pass the left wing. The airspace is quiet and this
gives the chance to use the airborne time to consi
der emergency procedures. "Imagine that the en
gine were to stop NOW, what are your actions and
where would we land, where is the wind and can l
see a field in range and without obstacles?" l have
time to repeat this perhaps ten times before appro
aching the first controlled airspace: Woensdrecht
Airbase CTR. Woensdrecht Tower gives permission
to cross at present height, passing directly over the
field and advises that Runway 25 is in use with one
Pilatus PC-7 in the visual circuit.
Somewhere around 3 miles from the field the engi
ne note changes slightly - not alarmingly so; engine
indications remain normal. A slight adjustment
of propeller pitch and engine power is the normal
reaction and that works once again. A few seconds
later however the engine begins to make a more
unsettling noise and the generator warning light
begins to flicker. l decide to perform a precautiona
ry landing at Woensdrecht and start arranging that
in the cockpit and with ATC. l am approaching the
field from the west and can proceed from present
position direct to low-key for 25, fitting in nicely
behind the PC-7 on base leg. Suddenly the engine
makes a most unhappy sound, looses power and
produces lots of dark grey smoke from both rows of
exhausts. Oil pressure is already down to 30 psi (be
low 35 psi the propeller can no longer be feathered).
It is clear that there is not enough energy to reach
low-key for 25; there is little or no power coming
from the engine and airspeed is now 150 knots. The
assessment is simple and quickly made: a landing
straight ahead on 07 offers the only possibility of
concrete - all other options will lead to a landing
on an unprepared surface. The wind is southerly
and only lightly favours 25, so no problem there. l
communicate this with ATC (but only a few seconds
later make a Pan call). Of note is that the young and
relatively inexperienced ATC controller remains
calm throughout and continues to provide useful
information. Of course, there is still the PC-7 now
on short finals for 25 - the opposite runway. l am
fortunate to also fly the PC-7 at Woensdrecht so l
know that his slow-lane is to the north and that
both aircraft will fit comfortably on the runway if
necessary. Should there be a problem, l can steer
into the grass to the south, The PC-7 communicates
with Tower over his UHF radio - he does not hear
my calls, only the Tower controllers reactions. The
result is that I have a complete picture of the situa
tion but that the PC-7 instructor and his student are
'slightly surprised' to see a Spitfire diving steeply
towards the opposite threshold!
l clearly have more than enough energy to reach
the threshold and l make a conscious decision to
concentrate fully only on achieving that goal. That
means that l do not shut down the engine, close
the fuel cock or switch off the magnetos. l simply
move the throttle to idle and (despite the oil pres
sure) move the propeller pitch to feather. The gear
lowers and l select flaps, lower the nose to a couple
of hundred meters short of the threshold to lose the
excess energy. Levelling off, l cross the threshold
at 100 knots and stay level as the speed bleeds off,
allowing me to keep the PC-7 in sight. He is on the
runway and has performed his SOP move to the
slow-lane as expected. Around now the propeller
stops rotating and l touch down in the 2-point
attitude and lower the tail. l pass the PC-7, both
at low speed and can roll free of the runway at 'C'
intersection with the last couple of knots of energy.
The whole incident has taken perhaps 120 to 180
seconds. l turn off all switches and exit the aircraft
to meet the fire services who are just pulling up.
These are the bare facts - the outcome was good
and, although this engine is a write-off, both
pilot and machine are further unharmed and the
Spitfire will fly again in 2012. There are however a
couple of things to think about in retrospect. First
the negatives: my decision not to shut down the
engine in the air could have led to a fire as the fuel,
magnetos and electrical power were not turned off
prior to landing. This was a conscious decision, but
the observation on fire risk is nonetheless relevant.
Secondly, although l was wearing a parachute, l
had not considered wearing a life preserver. If the
engine had failed just a few minutes earlier l would
have ended up in the water, without any flotation
or dinghy. l will not make that mistake again.
Now the positives: the outcome was good; partly
through luck but partly also through good prepara
tion. l think the American golfer Jack Nicklaus said,
when confronted with the opinion that he was very
lucky: "Yes l am, and you know it's funny, the more
l practice, the luckier l get". The pre-conditions for a
positive end to the incident. It is important to reali-
