SUMMARY
northern part. In the advance order of 19 October 1939 the main principle was
described as follows
'If possible to defeat a substantial number of units of the French Army
and its allied forces while at the same time obtaining the maximum
possible amount of NetherlandsBelgian and northern French territory in order
to guarantee optimal conditions for future air- and naval operations directed
against Britain and to have an extensive forward area in front of the Ruhr
industrie s'
The order not only indicated a compromise between an offensive- and defensive
policy, but also showed a greater influence of Supreme Air Force Command
(Oberkommando der Luftwaffe i.e. Goering) on Hitler at the expense of Supreme
Army Command (OKH). (The italised passage represents special 'Luftwaffe'
requirements)Realisation of the order meant violation of Dutch neutrality and
involvement of Holland in the conflict between Germany and the allied nations.
In this phase the planned operations against the Netherlands still bore a defensive
character and only the eastern part of the country was to be occupied. Possibilities
for operations against the central and western part - the heart of the defence
behind an inundated and fortified line in the central eastern part - were left open,
probably on the advice of the German Air Staff, which had a direct requirement
for Netherlands airfields in the 'Luftwaffe' airwar-concept against Britain. The
plan was subject to many changes, the accent was alternatively laid on ground
warfare and on airwar, but the offensive aspect was growing. German Supreme
Air Command i.e. Goering kept trying to make Hitler see the urgency for oper
ations against the central and western part of the Netherlands. This was based on
the following philosophy
a The German possession of Netherlands airfields constituted a more
direct threat against Britain
b Possibilities for flanking air- and groundattacks against Belgian and
French forces;
c Prevention of British landing operations in this area, which could be
followed by British air operations against the Ruhr industries from
Dutch airfields;
d The elimination of a possible threat to the important German right
flank operations which the partial occupation plan still included.
Hitler became increasingly convinced by Goerings views and his originally mar
ginal interest in Netherlands territory gradually changed into the opposite, but
not until 10 January 1940 he was fully convinced. Between 29 October 1939 and
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