SUMMARY
called 'Von Manstein plan'). All these changes together meant a breathing space
of at least 4 months for Germany's opponents. Between 16 October 1939 and
May 1940, the final date was shifted nineteen times, each followed by a delay
and between 15 January 1940 and 7 May 1940 there was a period of indecision.
In the meantime another aspect - the invasion of Northern Europe - the so-called
'Weseruebung' presented itself. This action aimed to deny the use of this part of
Europe to the allied nations and was conceived by Hitler in January 1940; he saw
it as one combined operation with consequences for the earlier planned operations
against Western Europe ('Fall Gelb'). The Luftwaffe however, could not give
sufficient support for this combined move and on 7 March 1940 it was finally
decided to seperate both invasions by a sufficient period of time for regrouping
and preparations. On 2 April 1940 Hitler decided to start the 'Weseruebung'
on 7th April.
By the earlier mentioned decision to use the full German paratroop- and airborne
potential with at least one quarter of the combat-ready a/c in the west against
the Netherlands, Holland became the pivot for the outcome of the campaign
against Western Europe. Proof for this can be found in the diary of general of
Artillery A. Jodl, Chief of Staff Operations, German Supreme Army Command,
and in a later commentary by General Speidel: 'On 6th February, a new idea
arose to restrict the operations to the invasion of Northern Europe and Holland.
Belgium's neutrality was to be guaranteed for the duration of the war.
With these grand-scale airborne operations against Holland, the starting-time
of all operations against Western Europe depended on the weather-situation over
Holland. Thus all postponements of the overall operation can be traced back to
prevailing unfavourable weather conditions.
General major Speidel, Chief of Staff 2nd Air Army also notes: 'Our command-
procedures were made difficult because of personal interference by Hitler, Goering
and the executive Staff of the German Airforce. This intrusion frequently went
into minute detail. The responsible cdr of the 2nd Air Army was often not in
formed and most times he could only at a much later date obtain some knowledge
about decisions which had been reached long before'.
The operational order for the airborne corps read'surprise-capture of the defence
position in central and western Holland behind the main central-eastern defence
line'. Four simultaneous operations were to be executed. General der Flieger
W. Speidel in 'Der Westfeldzug 1939/1940' gives them as follows:
1 Permanent capture of the main bridges over the wide sea-arms and
estuaries near Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Moerdijk (an essential
condition for further operations into the North first and South later)
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