SUMMARY
2 To prevent regrouping and reinforcement of the Netherlands forces
for the defence of the central-western defence position from the main-
eastern defence position by an attack behind the latter position;
3 Occupation of the airfields surrounding The Hague and elimination
of the Dutch reserve ground forces
4 Immediate occupation of the capital, The Hague; capture of the
Head of State, H.M. the Queeen, the government and Supreme
Armed Forces Command.
For political reasons (a.o. the colonial government in the Netherlands East-
and West Indies and the decisive influence of the head of state on matters of
peace, war and national survival) Hitler extended this to H.M. the Queen and
the House of Orange. These targets clearly meant that at least during the first
phase of the war, Airdefence Command had to bear the brunt of the first and
heaviest part of the German attack.
The pre-emptive surprise air-strike against all airfields and air installations
preceding the actual invasion-without any declaration of war-aimed to destroy
the Netherlands bomber- and fighter force (112 a/c) in one sweep. It was to be
followed by a massive air-transport move for the airborne-operations combined
with renewed air attacks against targets outside the airborne operation zones.
As a result literally all units of Airdefence Command at the moment of the invasion
were in a front-line position. The massive operations however did not produce
the desired results. Already on the first day the commander 2nd German Air Army
had to inform B-Army Group: 'As far as can now be evaluated 22th Division air
borne operations on' (airfields named near capital) 'are near-failure because of
heavy ground defence and AA-artillery of enemy'.
The airborne operations against the capital had lost their momentum, the air
fields had been recaptured, many transport a/c had been shot down (cf Annex B)
and through misorientation, navigational errors and heavy AA-artillery fire, many
troops could not be dropped in the planned zones. Of9 377 troops for the The
Hague area, only 55% (3 325) could be dropped in the vicinity of their zones (in
some 14 different places). They had no chance of reaching their targets and only
1100 succeeded in surviving as units or groups. The Rotterdam situation was more
favourable for the Germans: 90% of the planned 8100 troops could be landed
among them some 1 000 of the The Hague group. The air transport waves in
these two main sectors in total landed only 60% i.e. 10 500 men. This was mainly
due to the loss of 220 a/c out of 430 available and employed transport a/c. E.g.
from one 'Gruppe' of 53 a/c only 2 returned. General Speidel stated'This loss of
airtransport capacity was felt for years to come'
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